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SOCIAL ORGANISATION AND SOCIAL 
DISORGANISATION.
I.
In the course of an inaugural address delivered at this College a few weeks ago, the Professor of Social Anthropology referred to the close link which exists between the sciences of Anthropology and Sociology1 The connections are so close, indeed, that in certain fields the same names occur in the bibliographies without much change in the method of treatment of the materials. I have in mind the writings of Edward B. Tylor, Sir James G. Frazer, E. Westermarck, L. T. Hobhouse, E. Durkheim and a long list of others whose work bridges the two fields of study.It would not be difficult to show that Sociology is closely related to Psychology for, in the nature of things, minds make cultures and cultures, in turn, make minds. The close contact of the fields of study has produced a Social Psychology which, sometimes, makes it difficult to distinguish Psychology from Sociology. A considerable contribution has been made by psychologists to our knowledge of social processes and social theory: it is enough to think of the writings of McDougall, Wundt, Shand and the Psycho-Analytic School to perceive the debt one science owes to another.2 In its earlier days Sociology owed a deeper debt to Philosophy than to any other field of humanistic studies. Sometimes the sociologist becomes impatient and wishes to commit matricide by outlawing the study which gave birth to the modern scientific approach: We wish to produce a value-free science more akin to the mode of thought of the mathematician and the physicist but Philosophy keeps
1 M. Wilson: Some Possibilities and Limitations of Anthropo­logical Research. R.U.C. Occasional Addresses No. 1, 1948.
2 There are psychologists, however, who would not admit this:Allport in his Social Psychology contends that all explanations (as distinct from descriptions) must rest in individuals and that the causes of social phenomena, therefore are individual causes. I do not criticise the views of Allport here: a criticism will be found in Goldenweiser’s History, Psychology and Culture, Section 3 page 60. The Marxists lean to the opposite view; that the individual has no significant meaning. Culture is, to them, objective, historical, cumulative, and non-personal. Theories of society which rest on the concept of the collective mind, likewise underwrite the role of the individual.
1
“ butting in ” to ask questions about ultimate values.Let us pay cur debts, however, as Plato would require us, by recognising the value of the theories of society produced by social philosophers.3We who have inherited modernity know that Machiavelli is too modern to be mediaeval: Hobbes is the forerunner of the Leviathan which has grown larger until it has become the modern omnipotent and omnipresent State. The influence of Montesquieu's “ L’esprit des Lois ” is still alive in the writings of the geographical determinists. Our thinking is shot through with the ideas of Condorcet, Helvetius and Jean Jacques Rousseau. He is a poor sociologist who has never asked himself what kind of society is likely to be most successful for the life of the human species and who has not turned to the Utopias from Plato to Thomas More, Bellamy and H. G. Wells with a laugh with Shaw on the way.One prominent British Sociologist has even been bold enough to defend Social Philosophy in a recent essay.4 The Sociologist has no difficulty in finding congruity with some historians. He may not like Marx, Hegel, Spengler, or Toynbee. He is probably able to give adequate sociological reasons why their theories should be rejected, but at least they talk the same language as the sociologist. They accept events in time as having some significant meaning and a universe with discernible order. Perhaps the greatest difficulty of the sociologist is to fit his subject into the context of the historical anarchists, who like Democritus, give the world to chance: to many sociologists the casual remark of H. A. L. Fisher seems a rejection of the concept of order in the universe. You will remember Fisher writing that in the development of human destinies the historian should recognise only the play of the contingent and the unforeseen.5 The scientist naturally shrinks from the breach of cause and effect relations expressed in his enviable language. The contribution made by the student of History to Sociology has, nevertheless, been profound. It is necessary only to refer to the writings of Max Weber, R. H. Tawney and
3 Comte was primarily a philosopher and his work is devoted toa study in the philosophy of history: The same could be said of Herbert Spencer. The marked philosophical content of Lester Ward, Small and Giddings is matched by that of Pareto, Durkheim, and the German sociologists such as Tonnies and Von Weise: The period of systematis­ation appears to be over. The philosophical method has. been supplanted by the scientific method.
4 Ginsberg M. in Reason in Unreason in Society, 1947 
5 Fisher H. A. L. History of Europe, preface.
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Ernst Troeltsch to perceive the contribution which ripe historical scholarship makes to Sociology. The truth of the matter is that the roots of all knowledge are common. The fields of study may differ but they are unified by a common origin and a common methodology. Few Sociologists, Physicists, Economists or Historians find fault with John Stuart Mill’s methods of experimental inquiry.6 Misunderstanding of the common principles leads to the suggestion that differences of methods are equivalent to qualitative differences in the ranking of the sciences. The methods of Social Science are no less valid than those of Physics. The material for the study of society is much more complex, hence the range of predictability is smaller.
II.
It is not surprising that some connection can be demonstrated between various forms of facts found in the separate fields of the Social Sciences and even beyond these sciences. University teaching, for purely administra­tive purposes, divides knowledge into separate watertight bulkheads called History, Politics, Economics, Education, Anthropology, Law and Sociology, and the physical and biological sciences. The fact that these are classified as separate does not mean that the facts of each field of study are so divided and without connection. Lord Bacon once reminded us that we believe reason rules over words but that words react upon the intellect.7 Academic men are sometimes as much the victims of the phantoms of the market place as other men. I shall argue that this has produced most unfortunate results; that social facts do not fall readily into isolated compartments: that thehistorical division into separate fields of study has hindered the development of an appropriate methodology of the Social Sciences, and that practical results, particularly in the field of social planning, are retarded by the study of society as a series of separate specialisms.
However useful the development of taxonomy is to Botany and Zoology the tendency of the classificatory mind which separates and classifies on the basis of likeness and difference is to retard the emergence of an hypothesis of a dynamic type.
6 Mill J. S. A. A System of Logic, Book III Ch. 7 and 8 and for a discussion of Mill’s Canons of Method see Greenwood: Experimental Sociology Ch. 3.
7 Bacon: Novum Organon, Sections 43, 59, 60 et seq.
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Whereas Linnaeus8 was concerned with classification Buffon and Darwin9 were concerned with the spaces, if we may say so, between the classes. Classification is by nature static. Closer work reveals that species and genera do not remain within the confines of rigid categories. To Buffon is due the praise for perceiving that species merge into each other by almost imperceptible degrees of inter­mediate structures and functions. Each method has its appropriate world view. Classification leads to the doctrine of parallelism of species and the theory of separate creation. The theory of evolution is inhibited in such a framework: it emerges when classification and its method­ology have been replaced by a dynamic approach to the materials. The concept of casual relations is relatively absent from classificatory systems. True, taxonomic systems reveal order in nature and discover relationships: the order discovered, however, is not a causal order: This is not uncovered until a time sequence is involved in analysis.
We do not argue for the creation of chairs of “things in general” such as Professor Teufelsdroeckh held in his German University. We suggest that there is considerable value in the study of the interaction of events which do not seem directly connected with each other and of the mode of their inter-relationships. You will remember how Thomas Carlyle10 saw an intimate relation between the type of clothes characteristic of a period and the architec­ture of the period. The field has been exploited since by philosophers like Mr. Gerald Heard and by psychologists like Professor Flugel. It is in this field of interconnection, interrelationship, and integration that the sociological method is distinctive.
Society is a complex web of interrelationships and interaction. The attitude towards total synthesis has been constant from the first writings in the field of Sociology; thus says Comte:— 11
“ . . . There can be no scientific study of society, either in its conditions or in its movements, if it is separated into portions, and its divisions are studied apart . . .
8Linnaeus: Systema Naturae.
9 Buffon: Histoire Naturelle des Animaux and Darwin: Origin of Species.
10Carlyle: Sartor Resartus; and see Heard, Narcissus and Flugel, Psychology of Clothes.
11 Comte A. Positive Philosophy (trans. Martineau) 1893. Vol II, Page 67.
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Materials may be furnished by the observation of different departments: and such observations may be necessary for that object: but it cannot be called science.”
A concrete, but relatively simple illustration from Malinowski12 will make the implications clear. A descrip­tion of a Melanesian canoe can be given in purely descriptive terms. We might describe it physically in terms of length, breadth, buoyancy, sailing characteristics, etc. The naval architect might find this sufficient: thedescription is, however, partial. A full description, as Malinowski points out, would cover the ownership of the canoe and who might and might not sail it and when they might sail it. Here we deal with legal qualities that pertain to the canoe: but the canoe is built within an economic structure and subserves economic ends, hence adhering to the canoe are economic qualities. No canoe can be built without magic or religious rites: every stage of building is governed by non-technical factors. Malinowski’s description is detailed and should be read in full. Here, as far as we have gone the economic, legal, magico-religious factors are all necessary, as well as the technical, for an understanding of the concept “ canoe ” in Melanesian settings.
It would not be difficult to assess the complex web which surrounds cattle among the Bantu or, in a different setting, the role of the sacred cow in Hindu India: again, the object yields no true statement about its qualities if it is not related to its context. We take it that this is what Professor Whitehead13 means, in another context, when he says ” The concept of an organism includes, therefore, the concept of the interaction of organisms . . . the position here maintained is that the relationships of an event are internal, so far as concerns the event itself: that is to say they are constitutive of what the event is in itself” .
12 Malinowski B. Argonauts of the. Western Pacific, ch. 4-6.
13 Whitehead A. N. Science and the Modem World, ch. 6, page130.Toynbee says in A Study of History (abridged by D. C. Somervell), page 211:“A human society is, in itself, a system of relationships between human beings who are not only individuals but are also social animals in the sense they that could not exist at all without being in this relationship to one another. A society, we may say, is a product of the relations between individuals and these relations of theirs arise from the coincidence of their individual fields of action . . . Society is a “ field of action ” but the source is in the individuals composing it.”
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The task of the Social Scientist, particularly the Sociologist and Anthropologist, is the development of methods which cast light on the interdependence of a social event with all other casually connected events in a social framework. The argument has its philosophical implications.14 No true statement can be made about parts of wholes; parts require assignment to wholes. The more fully the relationship is displayed the more true the statement and the more accurate our knowledge; isolation perverts the essential uniqueness of the isolated event as well as its relativity. Thus an economic fact in isolation is less true than one which displays the specific qualities of, and its relationship to the legal, political and religious context in which it takes place. Does there exist, therefore a form of planning called “Economic planning"? Is there such a thing as an “ economic fact"? What are the consequences of planning one sector, in this case the Economic, without reference to parallel planning in the fields of Law, Politics and Religion? If our questions are valid we should be able to place the electric generator or the steam turbine in the focus of our picture and relate it to the specific economic, political and religious forms with which it is connected in the modern social fabric.
If we take economic factors as an example we can say that a particular type of fact is economic (not political, legal, etc.) because it possesses certain qualities in common with other economic facts which allow it to be classed as economic on the basis of similarity. As such it is related to other economic facts. On its operational side it modifies and is modified by its relation to the economic facts with which it is classed. The relationship between these economic facts constitutes an economic system or economic pattern: here singularity is a characteristic of the fact but relatedness is as much a quality as singularity. As Whitehead15 argues, the event is what it is because of its relations in a compound multiple system: it has a reduced meaning as a single isolated event. We have, therefore, an economic event in its individual aspect and the economic event involved in a relationship with other events styled economic. This latter we can call a system. In this sense we have economic, legal, political, religious systems each unifying related facts and forces. We have, too, the relationship between one event in the economic system and, let us say, the legal system and the whole
14 c.f. Russell B. History of Western Philosophy, 1946, Page770 for philosophical development.
15Whitehead A. N. Science and the Modern World, ch. 7, Pages 154-6.
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body of the economic system related to the legal system. The interrelation of all these elements we call a social system. The scope and function of Sociology can be defined as the study of society as a system of interacting individuals and inter-related groups of associations and institutions as a working whole. On its analytical side Sociology is concerned with the manner in which the individuals are related to institutions and the institutions are related to each other: Finally, it is concerned with the system as a whole in terms of its efficiency or inefficiency to produce a stable pattern of relationships.
III.
The views I have advanced cast some light on one of the major controversies of the day in which there are few neutrals.-—The struggles of the individualists against the collectivists. We might ask if there is a connection between the methods of study in economic theory followed by Professor Hayek, as a typical example, and his persistent attack on collectivist planning systems. Many of my audience will be acquainted with his “ Road to Serfdom ”16 in which his thesis is developed trenchantly. Few are likely to be acquainted with an obscure paper written by Professor Hayek entitled “ The Facts of the Social Sciences”17 published in 1943— that is, before his “ Road to Serfdom ” . The article is important because it explains much of his later work. Hayek contends that the meaning of any social fact is not external, but is in the mind of the observer: “ money is money, a word is a word, a cosmetic is a cosmetic if and because somebody thinks they are” .18 The Social Sciences aim at explaining individual and social behaviour by a process of classifi­cation of ascribed meanings.19 “ What we do is merely to classify types of individual behaviour”.20 There are many social scientists who would dispute Hayek’s point of view here; much that we have argued before does not involve any such extension of hypothetical individual behaviour to explain the nature of group processes. Hayek’s point is that meanings are set by the scientist and are not inherent in the social facts. He proposes to take simple models and *1820
16Hayek F. A. The Road to Serfdom. 1944.
17 Ethics Vol LIV, 1943-44 (University of Chicago Press) Pages
18 Op cit., Page 3.
19 Op cit., Page 7.
20 Op cit., Page 8.
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combine these to make a whole.21 It follows from this that the whole is merely a summation of the individual models. Criticising this view in the discussion which followed, Gruchy22 points out that it is no mere accident that Professor Hayek accepts this additive method. As it is developed the view is static and mechanistic and excludes dynamic aspects of reality. It is, says Gruchy, “ the only methodological procedure that is appropriate to his static, mechanistic view of economic reality” ; it is built up from mental constructs which cannot be grasped if relationship and interdependence are considered: as these are constantly changing in relationships, Hayek’s views lead to the argu­ment that the instantaneous grasp of events is alone possible and reality is single isolated events. It follows that the existing economic structure can alone be understood: planning of a collectivist type is impossible of achievement. It follows, too, that as the whole is reached by the summation of individuals the conclusions are likewise individualistic. Given the “ relationship ” type of approach the emergent type of economic and social theory is different. As relationships are dynamic the emergent theories are dynamic and can be extended to future theoretical possibilities. They are further collectivist, for it is the whole which is under consideration. The views of Lord Keynes more closely correspond to the views we have discussed: Keynes had abandoned what he calls “the atomic hypothesis” by 193323 and with this he had abandoned the static approach for a dynamic approach. That no economic structure can be grasped by merely adding the qualities of its individual business enterprises24 is one of Keynes’ constant statements.
IV.
If our argument is sound that interdependence is the key to sound method in the Social Sciences we must go beyond the economic system and attempt to determine the relations between economic events and other kinds of events of a non-economic character. I confess to greater
21 Op. cit., Page 12. “ The reason for this is simply that thesewholes or social structures are never given to us as natural units, are not definite objects given to observation, that we never deal with the whole of reality but always only with the help of our models.” Individuals are therefore real while wholes are abstractions of reality. ,
22 Ethics Vol LIV, 1943-44, pp. 216-222.
23 Keynes J. M. Essays in Biography. Page 28.
24 The criticism of independence underlies his General Theoryof Employment, Interest and Money.
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difficulties here. Where interconnections are sought one is apt to fall into metaphysics no less than Professor Hayek though for a different reason. If what constitutes an economic event is a complex of relationships to thousands of other economic events then by extension the economic event is connected with thousands of events in fields of a non-economic character. Any social event, for its complete understanding, requires knowledge of thousands of inter­acting, independent events. Either we require to know the relevance of every factor, and this is manifestly impossble, or we must search for a few dominant keys to the totality — that is a short cut to the meaning of the whole. Most attempts, either in Biology or Sociology which have attempted the short cut, finish by producing a telic prin­ciple (Hans Driesch, Spencer, Marx, Spengler, Smuts, Bergson, etc.). Of the thousands of operative factors in any situation is it possible that one, or at least a very few factors, determine all other factors in the complex, and if so can we interpret the whole by reference to the key factor? If there is a key factor is it the same factor at all times, such for example as we find in the theories of the crude economic determinists? Is it constant for some periods only and does it vary in different contexts and at different times in the life of a society? The geographical factor might weigh heavily on one phase of culture and seemingly determine social patterns, but the religious factors might operate at another phase of development, the political and economic at another period. It could be said that in the present phase the determinants appear to lie in the fields of technology and economics; if these do not ‘ determine ” Religion, Politics or Literature they act as controllers and can be related to these factors. In turn these economic and technical factors are affected by the operation of the factors existing outside these frameworks. As we have said cattle do not “ determine ” Bantu society, but using cattle as a key we can relate to it such institu­tions as marriage and the family, economic organisation, religious beliefs, inheritance and succession. This analysis of wholes by means of key operative factors is well known in statistical methods and is elementary in engineering design.25 The forces acting in society are not necessarily homogeneous; indeed some are contradictory— for example the religious ideology may be in conflict with the economic ideology within a particular society or the *
For the use of keys in mathematical analysis see Whitehead A. N. Op cit., ch. 2 pp 33-35, and Pearl R. Medical Biometry and Statistics. Mannheim K.Man and Society, p. 153 et seq.
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political sector may not be consistent with the economic sector.26Ortega Y Gasset, in an essay entitled “ Technics and Primitive Man”, points out that the development of science is the development of increased rationality, but as a result, also, of the development of Science man has become politically, morally and socially more irrational. Rationalism breeds irrationalism and culminates in the famous Nazi doctrine “ To hell with Reason.” The pattern is much more complex than that of Physics or Chemistry27 yet, until fundamental discoveries of a methodology for analysing connections are established the hope of a scientific approach to total planning of com­munities is remote though approximations can be achieved. We are forced to deal, not with cause-effect relationships in the Social Sciences but with an infinite number of interacting forces.
V.
The discussion of disharmonic elements in a society raises fundamental problems for the collectivist planner. Mannheim28 argues that planned sectors (that is sectors that are consciously integrated) cannot exist side by side with unplanned sectors: his qualification is that the area of the unplanned sectors must, in such cases, be greater than the planned. The alternative is increased disorganisa­tion. Nothing is more difficult than to fit a planned institution into an unplanned structure. We might remember Booth's diagnosis of the cause of London poverty: that there was too much Socialism, so that Capitalism could not function, or too much Capitalism to allow Socialism to function.29 The attempt to secure adjustments at different levels leads to conflicts between institutions in Society. Seemingly, once we are committed to state control in one set of institutions, there develops an inevitability of expansion to keep the planned sector in equilibrium within itself, and in relation to the external unplanned sectors. A simple example from a recent article30 should make this clear. It is agreed that we should
26 See Myrdal’s comparison in his American Dilemma of American democratic ideals with American practice in regard to race policy.27 Kaufman, F. Methodology of the Social Sciences. Ch. VI and Ch. XIII and Greenwood, E. Experimental Sociology for discussion on social complexity.28 Mannheim, K. Man and Society, Part IV, Section 2, page 155.29 Webb, B. quoting Booth’s Life and Labours of the People of____ London in My Apprenticeship.30 Article by Professor A. C. Pigou, “ Central Planning and Professor Robbins ” in Economica, Feb. 1948, p. 19.
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create social services for the poor, ill, the aged, children and so on, but when we agree to this we are agreeing to allocate resources which can be applied to a variety of alternative uses. One public sector thus directs some portion of the national income away from competing public sectors and similarly from private sectors; as one sector is controlled and expanded decisions are made which affect other sectors. The deciding body is the public sector operating through the Government. The system of control lies in the taxation service. Every definition of minimum social standards thus introduces elements of control and regulation of means previously subject to individual, that is private decision. The planned sector (public sector) must expand, and if no expansion takes place the ends cannot be attained, or if attained, the conflicts generated with the unplanned sectors accelerate.
Professor Hayek contends that there is no inevitable element in planning; that planning is not due to mechanical compulsions but to rational decisions. It follows that decisions are reversible. This does not answer the case we have given. A rational decision in the field of social services leads to means that involve further controls and planning. The first steps are rational, the later steps are mechanical and extra-logical. As society becames more elaborate problems of lack of synchronism can be met by planned public action only: having committed ourselves to industrial development and to the concomitant social legislation which rises with it, the field of planning must widen. There is no inevitability for the challenge thus produced might evoke no response, but the effect would be to increase social disorganisation. Lack of synchronisa­tion and ignorance of interconnections seems to militate against the possibility of planning, but disregard of interconnnection produces chaos. We seem to be on the horns of a dilemma. Modern sociology has, however, cast a good deal of light on the inter-relation of factors and on methods of measurement.
It has long been noticed that economic factors influence crime situations. The close connection between crime and movements of the business cycle have been studied, perhaps, more closely than other phenomena. Bonger’s31 work is well known in this connection. Dorothy Thomas 31 32 has studied movements of the business cycle and their interconnection with wide ranges of phenomena such as birth rates, death rates, marriage rates, divorce
31 Bonger W. A. Introduction to Criminology.
32 Thomas D. S. Social Aspects of the Business Cycle.
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rates and criminal rates. Much of the statistical analysis in this field is of a complicated order. We have long given up regarding poverty as due to human failure, drink or the devil. It is seen that in spite of rapid technical advance there is still scarcity for many millions even in the most advanced countries. Explanations have shifted from individual to group studies. Probably this field is the most complicated because of the numerous factors operating in the poverty complex; health problems have gradually shifted from individual to group problems. It is seen that social problems arise as a result of factors beyond individual control. The increased differentiation and multiplication of functions and interests and increas­ing complexity with diminished control of social forces appear to be most marked. Community action alone can affect changes and these can be controlled by skilled means only. Many problems are interrelated and mutually and cumulatively promotive of other problems. Unemploy­ment is connected with malnutrition; more unemployment means more crime; more unemployment means more prostitution; given low income we get slums; given slums we get disease; given low paid labour we get increased urban concentration and hence another factor works towards disease. A slum area is a complex of multi­factors. Certain factors such as low income are however keys to the complex phenomena found in slum areas. Closely related with low income are tuberculosis, mal­nutrition, high infantile and maternal mortality, juvenile delinquency and crime, high alcoholic rates, high per­centage of absenteeism, casual labour, high marital desertion rates, and a high infectious disease rate.
An increase in income would not cure all the other factors but would contribute more to a partial solution than tinkering with many of the secondary effects. Here the economic factor is predominant: In feeblemindedness, crippling, and insanity the primary causes are often genetic and attempts to alter economic structures do not avail to reduce incidence; while each problem has a key it is still the resultant of the operation of multiple interacting causes. I know of no social problem produced by a single factor.33 Social problems are symptoms of social disorganisation. Only a detailed knowledge of all factors involved can bring about a cure.
33 Durkheim E. Le Suicide is still readable as a demonstration of methods for handling multiple factors in elucidating the causes of suicide. The statistical techniques for measuring relationships dominate American sociology.
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One of the most potent causes of social disorganisa­tion is the effect of inventions and discoveries. Both create a sharp break in the traditional system. Another less obvious cause is the gradual evolution of things, processes and ideas which cumulatively increase in time until the end of the accretion is different from its beginnings. Some non-economic factors might dislocate society in the manner Marxism has done and thereby provide a partial refuta­tion of its own theories by illustrating the power of ideologies.
What are regarded as minor discoveries sometimes have effects of a serious character. Walter Lippman34 claims that the most important invention in the modern period is that of the contraceptive which, by reducing population, endangers civilisation. Western technology has extended to the Far East. The idea of romantic love has spread there too ; this bids fair to destroy the social basis of the oriental family on which the whole economy and political systems rest Professor Toynbee35 has sought to show that western influences have affected the economic and political structures of the Far East but that other aspects of culture have remained intact.
“ It is the easiest thing in the world for com­merce to export Western techniques. It is infinitely harder for a western poet or saint to kindle in a non- Western soul the spiritual flame that is alight in his own.”
It is more than structures and things which are exported. Political ideas and ideals do kindle in oriental breasts and they come from Western sources. They modify the ideas of the elite and filter through to the masses; the process is seen in the writings of Sun-Yat Sen36 the Father of Modern China. Even the European poets and novelists have influenced the form, style and content of Chinese Literature. The ideas of Western historians have caused Chinese scholars to rewrite their long history.37 The ideas of Marx and Keynes lie alongside each other on students’ bookshelves. The acids of modernity create criticism of Confucius: It becomes increasingly difficult to square Darwinism with Buddhism. To those who have
34 A Preface to Morals.35 A Study of History.36 Three Principles of the People (Kelly and Walsh, Shanghai, Trans. Price).37 Details of the artistic impact are given in Hu Shih Chinese Renaissance. (Haskell Lectures, 1933. University of Chicago Press, 1934).
V I.
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lived in the Far East many of Toynbee's references are not consistent with the complexity of the evidence. Our contention is that cultures are not diffused in parts. True, some of the elements are stronger than others and com­merce and technology rank highest. These are often imposed whereas other parts of the culture are denied to the importing group. It was so in China and Japan and is so in South Africa in their effects on Bantu culture. W e can agree that non-material culture lags behind, but when it does break through it creates the materials for social criticism. Japan, China, India, and even Russia are examples of the effects of diffused ideologies.
One of the symptoms of social disorganisation is that one part of the diffused culture is accepted or imposed to a greater extent than others. The speed with which inventions and discoveries are imported into an area may dislocate the local culture. At a time of rapid industrial expansion South Africa’s labour force is among the poorest in health and spirit; the discoveries of medical science, of the techniques of administration, of community organisation in urban areas, lag behind industrial develop­ment. Some of the most potent factors in disorganisation lie in this direction, in Europe as in Africa. Two aspects of culture may even be mutually contradictory. The best discussion of problems of disorganisation caused by differential development of segments of a society is in the various writings of Professor Ogburn. His discussion points to the rapid development of material culture and the slower development of social organisation: the latter does not change as quickly as the material culture deter­minant. Hence maladjustments in society are explained by the theory of cultural lag.38 Since there is interdependence between the parts of a societal pattern it follows that planning is required to maintain equilibrium of the society. Ogburn argues that material culture develops at the faster rate. Sorokin,39 however, has sought to show that in some cases the non-material precedes material changes. The central issue is, however, not affected; both protagonists admit social dislocation as an effect of internal disequilibrium caused by differential rates of expansion. Little research has been done into the details of cultural lag. It is not a ques­tion solely of the economic structure developing more rapidly than the political. The possibility emerges that even within a system such as the economic, different *3
38 Ogburn W. F. Social Change, 1938, Part 3, Page 196 and Ogburn and Nimkoff, Handbook of Sociology, 1947, p. 595.
39 Sorokin P. Society, Personality and Culture, 1947, p. 211.
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elements may develop at different rates. Economic theory indicates many problems of this type and I shall give examples later. If we accept Ogburn’s argument we require to know the leading factors and thence to adjust by planned action the lagging factors. This involves planning the whole of the educational, legal, religious and public attitudes through radical changes in the social institutions which deal with non-material factors as well as those in the economic sphere. We might admit that our know­ledge of the leading components is still undeveloped in a scientific sense, and we know probably less about the details of the lagging factors. If Ogburn is right the alter­natives are planning or social chaos. Social research there­fore is fundamental for planning: The educationalmethods of most Universities are still mediaeval and make it difficult to produce the type of research workers required for the task. The lag of the Universities has made it necessary to step outside their control or to use them instrumentally. In fundamental research the state is compelled to undertake the task hence the rise of state sponsored research councils and the transference of research to centralised controls. That the results might be happy or unhappy is beside the point.40
VII.
The basis of the modern social structure is machine production and power utilisation. Where these develop a variety of secondary consequences follow. Commodities are standardised: distribution, production and exchange ser­vices of a non-local type come into being, in some cases on a world wide basis. Particular types of political organisa­tion have been associated with the process so far. Without this political structure the economic sectors could hardly have developed, at least in their infancy. Whereas domestic economy is diffused over a large number of units, the new system is concentrated. Associated with this complex is a mathematically organised credit structure and a banking machine. Consequences which are reactive forces too, are the intricate development of transport and communications, urban centralisation, rural depopulation and the psychol­ogical motivation of profit margins as the rationally con­ceived end towards which the whole system operates. From the workman’s standpoint the system is characterised by wage payments, and by a hierarchy of occupational gradings and professions standing in defined relations to the owner­ship group and characterised by evolution of social status
40 For the universities and other bodies in research work see Bernal’s Social Functions of Science.
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through differences of income, education, social standing,, skin colour, or religion and habits. In spite of its logical perfections, in practice the system trembles periodically as a result of variations in the trade cycle and of inter­class conflicts. Movements of capital do not coincide with movements of labour; there are problems in correlating supply and demand: the insecurity of workmen produces class pressure groups which develop into demands for social security schemes and finally crystallise into state controlled social security schemes. Charity is outmoded and rights, based on defined minimum standards are granted on the basis that the workman is a victim of society and must be insured by society as of right. The possibility arises that in the world of the future all Europeans, at least, shall have Buicks but die of hunger through breakdowns in world food production and the increase of tension between classes and races which emerges from increasing social differentiation and the conflict of political groups with contradictory aims and goals. Whereas the sector of economics and technology is highly developed and rationally directed, the fields of Law, Education. Politics and Religion react by automatic reflexes; when they are planned they are planned as separate entities. These conditions have their reaction on the smallest primary groups. The prediction is that one in three marriages will be dissolved by divorce in the next five years in the highest developed country. The value system is lowered until deeds are done which would shame Huns and Goths. Religion becomes secularised: this is not surprising for the chief characteristic of western society is its acquisitive basis as Professor Tawney41 has indicated. The virtue of the modern world lies in its fluidity, but its virtue produces the vice of instability. In the past man released neurosis through the institutions of the church by the techniques of Loyola of Pamplona; the modern age has secularised even confession and looks to the ghosts of Vienna, to Freud, Adler and Jung.42 Idealism has, in the past, been associated with the religious thrill: the scientific method rests on strict realism and it remains to be seen whether it can produce altruism. It is a miracle that modern society coheres amidst its accidents and automatic reflexes. Whether we shall plan or not is irrelevant. The price of the virtues of our modern society is planning and still more planning —  not economic planning but overall planning; this has hardly emerged as yet. 41*
41 Tawney R. H. The Acquisitive Society and Religion and the Rise of Capitalism.
42M.M. Jung, Modern Man in Search of a Soul in particular.
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The condition of our cities shows that we cannot organise a complete nation. The town planning genius like Sitte, Sir Raymond Unwin, Professor Lascelles Aber­crombie, or Le Corbusier is not merely an expert in architectural design but has a profound knowledge of the totality of the social processes working in modern society. Early in his work Abercrombie stressed the need for adequate social surveys of urban areas before planning begins. The disastrous effects of planning by non- sociological architects is seen in the following quotation:
In Liverpool there is a good example of theatrical planning without the basis of commercial convenience. The principal office street is closed by the Town Hall at one end, midway is an open space, and at the far end is the old dock. When this was filled in it was a fine architectural idea to balance the Town Hall with a gigantic custom house and dock office . . . but the new building was clean outside the office area . . . the furthest part of the street has turned out a failure both for business and shops and both customs and Dock Board have abandoned the magnificent building which is out of touch with the shipping offices.”43
Architecture is hardly enough: the correct approach to town planning is functional, not architectural. No adequate planning can dispense with detailed surveys covering physical features, the local history, archaeology and architecture, communications, industries, population, health conditions, housing, open spaces, administration and finance of the area and the mode of interaction of all these factors. Without this initial work town planning is guess work. Integrative town planning requires team work between economists, geographers, demographers, medical men, sociologists and experts in public finance and administration.44 I express the hope that members of city councils who hear, or read, this will appreciate an argument that may have appeared academic when I began this lecture. There is no easy way or cheap way in town planning: many problems, superficially regarded, appear as transport problems to be solved by widening a road here and there or by the employment of a few extra traffic policemen or electrical robots: behind such problems lies a complicated mass of social, economic, legal, and financial problems which arise from the processes of urban­isation and suburbanisation, both of which are related to *4
43 Abercrombie L. Town and Country Planning. Ch. 1, page 105.
44 Op cit. Ch. 3, page 133.
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the economic structure of private economic enterprise.45 The distance between home and place of work widens yearly: the tubes go faster below and the high speed automobile goes more slowly above ground: what is required is a good knowledge of the forces making for centralisation of functions, land ownership control, knowledge of a wide variety of rating structures, rent structures, and close analysis of the dormitory and its socio-economic effects: By a peculiar set of circumstances the poorest part of the South African community— the non-European— lives marginally and therefore suffers more from the effects of unplanned townships like those around Johannesburg and Port Elizabeth than the European. London, no more than Johannesburg, seems anxious to get down to its problem— the causes of centralisation and dispersion and to the study of the hundreds of factors that produce chaos in the modern city. If we have not solved relatively simple tasks at the level of city units, can we be expected to solve more complicated international economic and social planning problems? As far as town planning is concerned more overall planning is required and less street planning.
VIII.
I have no doubt many of you will feel I ask too much: that the type of men who shall be capable of grasping the multitudes of factors involved in social situations does not exist and that the demand is set too high. If we search for such men, it might be suggested that they exist already in large scale public and private enterprise.
Higher administrative and executive officials in the Civil Service and in industry are well trained and capable of handling large scale organisation and have considerable analytical power. Can the existing bureaucracy carry out the task of integrative planning? The public servant, the academic workers and business and technical experts are examples of the rational man “ par excellence.” It might be suggested that they are so rational that they cannot understand irrational behaviour. It is probably for this reason that the economic theorist has never been able to
45cf. The Royal Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial Population of Great Britain for an intelligent attempt to analyse the factors involved. For the socio­economic factors involved in urban areas see Sorokin and Zimmerman Rural-Urban Sociology. For the diagnosis of the diseases of urbanisation see The Culture of Cities by Mumford.
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fit Veblen’s “ theory of conspicuous expenditure into the framework of economic theory. Irrational behaviour is discarded from most sciences except perhaps Social Psychology, Anthropology and Sociology; yet whoever deals with social organisation must understand the pro­found irrationality of much individual and social behaviour. I have no doubt there is a place for pure economic theory divorced from time, place and irrational institutions but such a study cannot tell us much about the manner in which institutions behave except in a meta­physical world. The pure economic theorist deals with logical and mathematical categories. Technological modes of thought exclude magic, religion or metaphysical cate­gories. The mind is that of the scientist. The object is predictability, constancy of data and verification. This development of the rational man, the technologist and the theorist of economic structures is connected with a particular kind of economic structure. Associated with this structure, as Max Weber47 has shown, is an appropriate type of mind, the business man and the civil service bureaucrat. Traditionalism must be discarded for its basis is irrational. The index to success or failure is a mathe­matical index measured by profit and loss accounting.48
While the technological and economic sector is the result of rational decisions these, however, are qualified by the fact that instabilities within and external to economic institutions make rational thought almost impossible. Cumulative errors in reasoning react to make the system still more irrational. We enter a new realm here for understanding social disorganisation at a deeper level. The business man and the economic theorist think rationally about matters that are disorganised and often irrational. The rational is always impersonal: it is perhaps this impersonality which has alienated the public from the civil servant and the workman from the large scale employer. Yet impersonality is impartiality and is thus commendable. The actions of the political state must be
46Veblen T. Theory of the Leisure Class.
47 Weber Max. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. A part Translationof this work has been made by T. Parsons as The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation, 1947. The problem of rationality is dealt with in Ch. 3. See also Gerth and Miles Essays from Max Weber, Ch. 8, p. 196. A review of Weber’s economic writings appears in Economica (London School of Economics) Vol. XV. No. 57, February 1948. Rational technology is dealt with on page 41 of Shiel’s review.
48 Theory of Social and Economic Organisation, Pages 72 and171.
19
certain and show no favour. In the business structure and in its political counterpart the limits of duty of each servant are defined: in the case of the civil servant the ultimate appeal is the law. The business man and the civil servant possess common characteristics. It is from the economic pattern that the political derives its outlook and organisation and the likeness between the types is not an historical accident. We owe a great deal to the modern bureaucrat. The bureaucratic business and the civil service are, from a technical point of view, the most efficient organisation for carrying out defined ends ever produced. All our modern forms of social organisation, except the most elementary, are nothing less than shadows from the bureaucratic administration inherent in modern economic structures.
Dilemmas are presented to us here: An increasing degree of efficiency in the machinery of social and economic planning seems to imply an increase of the power of bureaucracy but this leads to progressive loss of liberty, or at least to an increase of impersonality.49 There are further difficulties; industrial and political bureaucracies are rational instruments yet democracy is in a fundamental sense, irrational.50 Rationalism is impersonal. Democracy stresses the significance of each individual: hence rights and duties vary with persons. How can liberty and individualism fit into a planned and collective state and still allow a high degree of predictability and certainty of policy which is the essence of rational planning? The decision between such alternatives is no light matter: it appears that some of the elements in modern society are mutually contradictory. The choice is limited, a developed bureaucracy can become one of the most efficient instru­ments when it works on the rational level of adjusting society through understanding the nature of social forces. Consequent economic gains are the result of political or business rationalism but with corresponding losses in what we have learned to appreciate as the life of full men in political terms. The alternative seems to be less than maximum efficiency with less public control with con­sequent risk of social disorganisation together with a low level of certainty and economic security. Redefinition of objectives seems to be required. The bureaucrat, either under capitalism or socialism, might be able to adjust society but at a price which few Europeans would be
49 Theory of Social and Economic Organisation, pp. 309-310.
50 cf. Mannheim K. Man and Society, Pages 55-59 in this connection.
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willing to pay. Most men prefer government as an art rather than as a science, yet we must confess that we are poor artists and still have much to learn. To clarify the issues involved let us separate the two types we have characterised as the prime representatives of the modern spirit; these as we have seen are the organisers of industry and the organisers of the state. Whitehead51 tells us that the organising type emerges as industry and technology expand: the rational types become the organisers ofindustry. The task of the organiser in industry is the adjustment of the relationship of men to men, men to things, and things to things. We may note the impersonal factor involved in such principles of business organisation: conflicts are inevitable. The workman objects to the rationalism which classes men and commodities together. Efficiency is not the same as happiness and workmen react to the industrial bureaucrat as citizens react to the political bureaucrat. Psychologically a cleavage exists between workmen and organisers. The resistances make the rational efforts of the organiser irrational. A portion of the con­trols is always out of his hands. The more efficiency in organisation the greater the resistances and the smaller, relatively at least, is the gain in efficiency. The psycho­logical setting, as Whitehead points out, is that the organiser is a leader but not one chosen by the led; his ends and motives are not regarded as the ends of those whom he leads. The element of contradiction, and there­fore of irrationality, is obvious. The factor of group •organisation enters: the organisation of the factory, mill or mine, is in the hands of its legal owners. The off­setting organisation is the growth of trade unions. There are therefore two types of rationality incorporated in two types of institutions with different objectives. Both operate within a single system, namely, industry.
The total system produced by this inter-group tension is irrational because it is the accident of a resolu­tion of the tensions between the two contradictory institutions. The curious situation arises that two types of rationality are operating here to produce a final irrational system. The trade unionist rationally directs his ends, likewise the employer.52 The ends are often mutually exclusive, therefore the total system is irrational:
51 Whitehead T. N. Leadership in a Free Society, 1937, pp. 82et seq.
52 The conflict between shop stewards and managers on the question of workshop control is inherent in the modern system: it remains to be seen whether production committees in Britain overcome the conflicts.
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the workman aims at control of industry, the employer aims at the suppression, or at least some limitation, of the power of the unions. Certainly, leadership is divided. The organisers of industry are not the natural leaders of workmen. Whitehead53 tells us that the managerial organisers should have tact, kindliness and a high degree of technical ability. These are desirable ethical qualities but do they not conflict with the objectives of the same person in his capacity as organiser, for here his primary task is to produce maximum profits. This latter is held to be predictable and measurable. The former ethical qualities are not. Hence economic considerations take precedence over ethical considerations. To adjust economic ends to ethical ends within the present strucure of industry is to invite all the criticisms which have been directed against Aristotle’s “ Theory of the Mean ” . In the conflict between employer and workmen the organiser has, by his functional position, taken sides and can hardly be regarded as an impartial spectator. The ultimate test of a good organiser is not ethical intentions or actions, but the balance sheet.54 As society is organised it places the organiser in dual positions and employers and workmen in opposite camps. The history of the shop stewards’ movement in Britain is an indication of the typical tensions centring round the problem of “ who shall control industry?” The social effects of conflict are hardly ever analysed by business men. Speeding up a conveyor belt is one aspect of technical efficiency. What are the social effects of increased economic efficiency? The balance of the age and sex groups employed in industry might require radical change, young people displace old; the indigency rate rises, relatively young men being placed on the scrap heap. Is the extra efficiency worth the social cost? 55
As matters stand few business men reflect on the social consequences of business decisions nor could they control these forces if they wished. No one else is responsible, therefore no such forms of social thinking take place Even the humanitarian employer pays little
53 Whitehead T. N. Op cit., Page 85.
541 do not say this ought to be. I am suggesting that each class has its own social objectives and that these some­times conflict in the modern economic structure; that divisions of men with separate ends produce tensions between men; cf. W. L. Warner and J. O. Low The Social System of the Modern Factory (Yankee City Series) for examples.
55 Phelps H. A. Contemporary Social Problems, 1940, p. 395 and Epstein A. “ The Older Worker ”. in Ann. American Academy, Vol. 154. pp. 28-31.
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attention to the social effects of his well-intentioned policies. Pension schemes put a premium on the selection of young workers and discriminate against the older worker, family allowance schemes have obvious selective tendencies. Here the final effects are far off. Pensions and allowances are good, but not if they produce more unemployment among older, or married workers. What is a rational and ethical act becomes another factor for producing irrational social effects. Many of these problems do not arise from the activities of the civil service bureaucrat: he has no efficiency standard to guide him; bureaucracy is often attacked on this very point. The hierarchy which binds him is different from that binding the business bureaucrat. Where the civil servant fails in efficiency the causes are often due to the operation of different factors from those operating on the business executive. The pattern of the civil servant is set in the wider view: he need not concern himself solely with profit and loss accounts— at least his limits are not so narrow as those of the business bureau­crat. No one has succeeded in making a national system of education yield a profit, nor can this be done with public health services, the army or the social services. The book­keeping of the civil service, in some of the most significant departments, has no profit and loss account. From its nature there is always a deficit. Non-remunerative services can be subsidised from trading accounts which yield a surplus. Subsidisation out of the rates or tax accounts takes place. Many of these non-profit services are among the most commendable in the modern state and local government.56. No index has, however, been found to measure the efficiency of the work of the civil service bureaucrat. This might produce all the characteristics the •citizen associates with the civil service but it can be said that he suffers less from the dominance of the profit account than the business executive. While there are common grounds which unite the two characteristic types of bureaucracy of modern times the psychological setting is different for both, and the framework of social organisation in which they operate separates them. The potentialities for producing integrative social thinking lie more with the civil service bureaucracy than with the business bureaucrat. I do not say that the Civil Service succeeds in integrative thinking; indeed it does not. I stress the potentiality of the civil servant as against the social limitations of the business bureaucrat.
56 For examples of the accounting system of local government in Great Britain and its incomparability on cost or profit criteria with private enterprise see Finer H. Municipal Trading. ch. 8 and table on pp. 154-5.
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The question “ who is more likely to be able to organise society on a basis of interrelation?” leads us to the provisional answer that it is more likely to be the civil servant. It is significant, however, that the upper layer of the business bureaucracy, in England and America, has strong affiliations with the political bureaucracy. They seem as much at home in one as in the other world. Lord Ashfield of the London Passenger Transport Board, Sir Alexander Duncan, Lord Melchett, Lord Leverhulme, Lord Reith are notable examples. There is sense of “ calling ” to public service not unlike that of the upper administrative grades of the civil service.57 It appears to be characteristic of a well developed modern system that the bureaucrat is adaptable to both business and political sectors and that the interconnection is close. The same can be said for the trade union bureaucracy which is likewise transient between industrial and public adminis­tration. Some have been so impressed by the mobility of these types that they have forecast the time when the “ owner ” of the business enterprise will “ pass out ” in favour of the organiser or managerial type. Veblen58 appears to have been the first to suggest that modern industry is characterised by a distinct managerial type who, while not the owners of industry, yet possess ultimate decision in industry. The idea has commended itself to some who adopt the view that neither owners nor workers can or should “ own ” industry; equally socialists of the type of Sydney Webb59 accept the argument • of the skill of the managers as proof that industries should be socialised with the managerial class in control but under democratic control. The sociological studies of businesss enterprise by Berle and Means69 strengthen the argument for managerial, rather than owner control. The characteristic of modern industry is, according to this school, bureaucratic corporation ownership, not private ownership. Burnham has popularised the argument that the next stage of development lies neither in capitalism nor socialism but with control of industry by the manager
IX .
57 Brady A. A. in his Business as a System of Power suggests other reasons for the interconnection.
58Cf. Veblen T. Engineers and the Price System, Vested Interests and Absentee Ownership: for what he regards as the functional uselessness of the owners see his Theory of the Leisure Class.
59 Webb S. B. Decay of Capitalist Civilisation.
60 Berle A. A. and Means G. C. The Modern Corporation and Private Property.
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or organiser group. Such a movement, it is argued, would unify the economic and political sectors— the economic and political bureaucracy61 and, therefore, make both sectors amenable to control and adjustment. While I do not accept Burnham’s thesis it should be admitted that there is value in his classification of the modern industrial bureaucracy. At the base is the primitive type of general­ised industrial organiser: here, in one person, is united the function of organiser, manager, financier— the managing director of the small business— the “rule of thumb man” . This type has given way to the specialist trained as a technologist, as chemist, physicist, textile technician, or engineer, who spends his industrial life seeking solutions to specific day to day problems arising out of the produc­tive process, or seeking, by research methods, new technical processes. This type may own (but usually does not) the industrial enterprise in which it carries out its work. The third type separated by Burnham is the managerial, or organising type: here, as we have indicated, the task is co-ordination of men, things, processes— the bringing of things into right relations. The first type has had less significance since the first world war: the validity of the separation of the latter two types is known to those who have been employed in modern large scale enterprises. The latter managerial type is a new type produced by differ­entiation of the industrial bureaucracy. Often they are trained technicians who have gained further administrative experience beyond mere technology. Whitehead notes the functions of the organising type as does Veblen.62 Max Weber63 appears to have missed the third type by failing to distinguish it clearly from the technical group. The third group had hardly emerged in his day. The distinc­tions which mark off the technician from the managerial type lie in the exercise of authority and control. The technologist is limited to his specific task and is subordinated to the managerial type. The typical conflict is seen in Eugene O ’Neill’s play “ The Hairy Ape,” in the conflict between the bridge and the engine-room on board ship, between captain and chief-engineer. This conflict goes deep in most modern organisation. The British Civil Service has had an internal struggle for many years on the degree of control which is exercised by the Administrative Class of civil servant over scientific
61 Burnham J. The Managerial Revolution.
62 Veblen was confused, however, in his typology. Cf. Vested Interests, pp. 58-59 and Absentee Ownership, pp. 270-274.
63 See the criticism of Weber by T. Parsons in Social and Economic Organisation, Page 52.
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specialists— of non-scientific officers over scientific officers. The conflict has centred on the claim by scientific officers holding key positions to have direct access to cabinet ministers. So far the technician has been no more successful in the civil service than inbusiness in gaining control. Finer64 takes the view that the scientist (technologist) has neither the educational nor the social traditions necessary for direct control of public policy. We can but reveal the conflict, not resolve it. The argument has, so far, gone against the scientist and technician in business as in the civil service: the problem, therefore, arises whether the training of the managerial class is suitable for the task of integrative planning. Burnham appears to think so and this is implicit in his argument, though he does not prove the superiority of his claims for the managerial group. The fact remains that the scientist and research worker in both types of bureaucracy, industrial and civil service, are subject to control and direction by the generalised administrator. I know no training which is less likely to produce humanists or which is more cut off from the understanding of social 
implications of its own work than that offered by most u n i v e r s i t i e s  under the name of B.Sc. courses in Technology. This would have been true also for medicine until the advent of courses in social medicine involving sociological materials. In spite of the dominant place occupied by technology in modern society the universities have not yet produced a curriculum to justify the control of industry by technologists or scientists.
This might be produced as an example of Ogburn’s “ cultural lag ” theory. Both technologists and adminis­trators tend more and more to be drawn from the universities, but there has, as yet, not emerged any train­ing in large scale administration with equal emphasis on social orientation and technical training. The civil service in the main, seems to prefer a broad education to a specialised education for its administrative grades. Here it is difficult to follow Burnham when he says:
“ The managers think of solving social and political problems as they co-ordinate and organise produc­tion. The executives think of society as a price governed mechanism. The owners think of what happens to the credit machine."
64 Finer H. The British Civil Service, pp. 80-83 and see Laski H. Limitations of the Expert, Fabian Tract No. 235, on the position of the expert in the civil service.
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It can be argued that nothing in their university or technical college training suffices to allow the managerial class to think adequately in this fashion except in a vacuum. This, as we have said before is more true for the business administrator than the civil service adminis­trator. Between the two types lies the modern public utility company officer who has many of the specialised abilities of the industrial bureaucracy with the social attitudes of the civil servant. These latter loom large in modern collectivist planning schemes in Britain, U.S.A, and South Africa.65It is true that the modern structure cannot exist without a bureaucracy which integrates, by organisation, the whole of the structure. The organisation is by paper directives and the paper directives are issued by the bureaucrat. Neither technologist nor managerial organiser have, as yet, the width of training to produce a co-ordinated society. The Universities lag in this respect in as much as they do not train the controllers of industry to face, with knowledge, the tasks of co-ordinative thinking outside one sector.Mankind must needs shiver when controlled by technologists but no less if control is fully vested in Burnham’s managerial class:
X.
I have given reasons why I consider that the civil service bureaucrat might be able to solve integrative problems more successfully than the business organisers. The “ state managers ” are closely connected with the universities, for the key to most developed civil service bureaucratic structures, as Max Weber pointed out, is the examination system. Patronage or affiliation being out­moded we resort to the democratic test of examination: here the universities become linked, in no uncertain way, with the political bureaucracy. Each stage of university reform has produced a corresponding change in the mode of entry to the civil service. The development of business bureaucracy has again played a part in moulding, by imitation, the structures of the civil service. Each step in the civil service reforms of the 19th century by Northcote, Trevelyan and Jowett has its parallel in university reforms.66Much can be said against examination systems but for a merit system in a democratic framework no other method obviates the dangers of patronage. We still carry
65 See Brady op cit.
66 Cohen. E. Growth of the British Civil Service, p. 22.
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about with us, however, the relics of Jowett’s assumptions respecting thte best fields of study for the aspiring civil servant,67 and we might question whether his suggested training is suitable for the duties imposed on the civil servant in a “ social service ” state.
The subjects for examination will be those commonly taught in the public schools and studied at Oxford and Cambridge . . . .  these consist of Classical Literature, Mathematics and Natural Science, Political Economy and Law and Philosophy. Modern Languages and History.”68
In spite of many changes the bias is still in the same broad direction. We might ask, however, whether a classical education, or a degree in History, even in Politics (without Public Administration and Finance) will provide a training in the techniques of overall planning or provide solutions to modern problems in Economics or Politics.69 These, no doubt, provide the right humanism necessary for the art of governing but they can hardly provide the knowledge of techniques and processes in a world where problems compel a different kind of know­ledge. Both humanism and culture are required in a world which gives itself over periodically to brutality, but humanism must have added to it the knowledge of a complex social structure on which it has to work. Here again, however, the civil service scores over the business bureaucrat. The technologist is the source of our modern social dynamic. He changes worlds overnight but no allowance is made in his training for the humanism required in a democracy. The Universities are much to blame for this barbarism inherent in training in some fields of physical science; the work of the scientist must be geared to social, political and moral forces. Conversely the knowledge of a few Greek texts and batch of Latin tags is not enough to organise the modern state, much less adjust its mechanical difficulties. Implicit in my argument is the need for breaking down mediaeval classi­fications of subjects in the University and substituting new classifications. Engineers who have built our world require more social data to integrate their achievements with the
67 What follows is more true of Great Britain than the U.S.A. and the Union of South Africa.
68 Cohen E. op cit. p. 84 (quoting Jowett).
68 There is a good deal of evidence to suggest that social orientation has been lost rather than gained, cf. Clark G. N.: Science and Social Welfare in the Age of Newton, 1937, and the essay by L. Hogben in Political Arithmetic.
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effects of their work. The classicist proceeding to the public services requires a great deal more scientific training. An advancing Sociology supplies the link between fields of study.
XI.
Professor Andre Siegfried spoke in this hall a few weeks ago; he warned us that a disaster of some magnitude might fall upon us within the next fifty years. I do not think we have fifty years in which to speculate on human problems. The atomic bomb is here now. So far we have produced a physics of the bomb but no sociology of the bomb. We do not spend enough on social research, particularly in the type of social research designed to study the relations between social groups or racial or national groups. We are not yet so helpless that we cannot control the use of scientific weapons. Mumford70 argues rightly that we are not yet victims of scientific determinism; he argues that it is both reasonable and feasible to limit the expansion and use of technology and to concentrate on raising the non-material elements of our civilisation and that these are decisions of human will; deliberate and conscious planning is required to attain this. To be rational, if we do control a highly dynamic technology which leads to the atomic bomb, we should work out the consequences of its retention within modern society. A new Sociology, based on atomic energy and aviation is required yet there is little sign of this developing. If we will not develop social organisation to limit the use of the bomb then we must face the fact that our existing social institutions must be changed and changed quickly.71 Cities will require to be dispersed and low density areas became typical rather than the centralised urban con­centration. Text books of Economics will require to be rewritten particularly in respect of chapters on the economic factors involved in the location of industry. Continued urbanisation is death to millions: the maximum concentration should be about 1,000 persons: the great metropolitan cities will be doomed: every ingenuity would require to be used in the selection of industrial and housing sites. One could go on like this replanning the basis of the new project. We are back where we started at the commencement of this lecture: if we inject a new
70 Mumford L. Technics and Civilisation, 1946, p. 282, and hisessay Programme for Survival.
71 On the direction of possible changes see the interesting paperby W. F. Ogburn “ Sociology and the Atom in Amer. Journal of Sociology, Vol. 51, No. 4, Jan. 1946.
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element it cannot be studied in isolation: it disturbs all 
other sectors of society: conscious planning is required to 
make adjustments. With each invention the time and 
distance scale contracts. The state and universities 
developed the bomb, they must now work out the social 
machinery required for internal and international organisa­
tion to stop its use or work out the social consequences of 
its retention in every field of our civilisation. This, I 
consider the most pressing task of the social scientist and 
the training of such planners is the fundamental duty of 
the modern Sociologist.
